Editorial | Fixing the NaRRA Bill

The bill to establish the National Reconstruction and Resilience Authority (NaRRA), the agency to lead Jamaica’s post-hurricane reconstruction, gets several important things right. But there are many things to fix.

Its mandate is too wide, making it a potential catch-all for government projects; and its proposed oversight insufficient.

The NaRRA allows the authority to consolidate and prioritise projects, procure goods, works and services, establish project tracking systems, and include climate resilience standards in programmes and plans. It also requires a public register of approved projects, annual reporting, audited accounts, and eventual dissolution.

The last point matters. Too many “temporary” Jamaican institutions develop the life expectancy of a giant tortoise. The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), for example, was set up as a temporary three-year project. NaRRA, at least on paper, is also meant to be time-bound.

Clause 19 of the bill points the law in the right direction by requiring plans to prioritise especially vulnerable areas and to take account of climate resilience and environmental realities such as rainfall, groundwater and surface-water flow. That is exactly the kind of thinking Jamaica needs for the future. Jamaica cannot continue rebuilding in areas that are clearly vulnerable; and doing so using borrowed money. A reconstruction authority must embody “build forward better”.

SERIOUS PROBLEMS

But the bill has serious problems. While it gets the mission broadly right, it does not yet meet the criteria public bodies in Jamaica actually need to be successful.

The first weakness is governance. The proposed act says the Schedule will govern the constitution and procedure of the authority. That Schedule would be expected to set out a board structure, membership rules, quorum, conflict-of-interest provisions, committees, and a distribution of power between board and management. Instead, the institutional centre of gravity is the chief Executive Officer. The Schedule, as drafted, is far more about the office of the CEO than about a properly governed Authority. That is too much concentration for a body that could be responsible for large contracts, politically sensitive decisions and substantial public expenditure, much based on loans from multilateral institutions. Jamaica has had enough experience to know that institutions built around one office often work brilliantly when led by a star and badly when led by a “problem” individual. Law should be designed for the second possibility, not the first.

The second weakness is over-centralisation in the political executive. The Cabinet issues the official list of approved projects. The authority develops programmes and detailed plans, but implementation remains tied to Cabinet approval. On top of that, the minister may direct NaRRA and may even require it, in relation to implementation, to take or refrain from taking certain actions, with which the Authority must comply. That degree of centralisation risks producing a body that appears accountable, but without being truly operationally independent.

That is often the formula for delay in Jamaica, mixed signals and political controversy, and ultimately the loss of public support and trust. NaRRA cannot be asked to run fast while keeping both its shoelaces tied to the centre at Jamaica House.

The third weakness is procurement and financial credibility. The Bill says the authority may procure goods, works and services and establish compliance, monitoring and risk-management systems. It also requires proper accounts and annual audits. Good. But not good enough!

The auditor is appointed each year by the CEO, albeit with Cabinet Secretary’s approval. The Bill does not itself spell out a strong procurement integrity regime, clear emergency procurement rules, publication of contract awards, variation orders, beneficial ownership, or conflict-of-interest safeguards. In the Jamaican context, where public confidence can vanish quickly, this is a serious omission. A reconstruction body handling large sums should be designed like a bank vault, not a piggy bank.

TRANSPARENCY

The fourth weakness is transparency. While there is a register that will be open to public inspection, it is important that what the register contains is agreed. The Bill now proposes only the name and description of the approved project, the applicable programmes and plans, and any other particulars later prescribed. Again, not good enough. The public should be able to see project cost, funding source, contractor, parish, start date, completion target, current progress and major variations. Without these elements, the register becomes a list of intentions rather than an instrument of accountability.

Then there is the matter of timing. The first formal review of the Act can be as late as five years after it comes into operation, with an audit and evaluation by the auditor-general not later than four years after the appointed day. For an authority meant to respond to post-disaster urgency, that is far too long. A temporary reconstruction body should face its first hard, independent review within 12 to 18 months. The country cannot wait five years to ask whether it is working.

The proposed NaRRA is a necessary idea, but not strong enough. Jamaica does need this special vehicle for reconstruction and resilience. But special vehicles can be dangerous if they are fast and powerful without being accountable, and properly governed.

The Bill must be improved via the parliamentary process, including a Joint Select Committee with inputs from relevant stakeholders. At a minimum there are three changes that would make it fit for purpose:

• replace the CEO-heavy structure with a proper board-led governance model with parliamentary oversight:

• limit ministerial directions to broad policy, not operational intervention; and

• place procurement transparency and disclosure rules directly in the Act, including contract awards, variation orders and regular public reporting. Add to that a stronger public dashboard, including local level consultation, and an earlier review mechanism

Good public policy demands that a NaRRA is both fit-for-purpose and embody learning that will endure into a climate future of shocks and uncertainty.