Editorial | Troy Bridge to NaRRA accountability 

Taken together, the reopening of the Troy bridge, the auditor general’s findings on the National Water Commission (NWC), and the intense debate surrounding NaRRA tell a remarkably consistent story about Jamaica’s public sector.

It is a story of a state that has become very weak at implementation and execution.

On paper, Jamaica has built what appears to be a first-class compliance and regulatory architecture, but the delivery mechanism is lagging very badly. In fact, the problem runs much deeper when we recall that many of the recommendations flowing from the findings of the various agencies are often ignored. In a new and somewhat troubling development, public servants are now challenging the findings of regulatory and compliance agencies in court to block information.

The reconstruction of the Troy bridge took almost five years after the original bridge collapsed during Tropical Storm Grace in 2021. The bridge itself cost approximately J$230 million and was eventually completed and opened in June 2026.  

PUBLIC DISCUSSION

What made the Troy bridge significant was not simply the project itself, but the public discussion surrounding it, led by the prime minister.

Officials openly acknowledged that the delays were caused by the multiple stages required for feasibility studies, environmental reviews, public investment assessments, procurement approvals, contracting processes and compliance procedures. The prime minister himself used Troy bridge as an example of how difficult it is for the Jamaican state to move infrastructure projects from concept to execution.  

The Troy bridge exposed what might be called Jamaica’s “implementation deficit”, which is linked to widespread gaps in capabilities – project management skills, technical skills, financial resources, and trust. The low level of trust has led to more layers of bureaucracy to minimise corruption. The issue goes way beyond procurement, the usual bogeyman.

The important lesson from the Troy bridge debacle is that, as a country we can build, but we cannot do so quickly.

The auditor general’s recent work on NWC points to a different, but related issue. The focus is not project delivery, but operational effectiveness. The audit examined the effectiveness of managing capital projects and the ability of the NWC to fulfil its mandate of delivering water and wastewater services.  

SIMILAR PATTERNS

Over many years, auditor general reports on public entities have repeatedly revealed similar patterns:

Weak project management, cost overruns, procurement deficiencies, delayed implementation, poor asset management, weak monitoring systems.

One key missing element all around is accountability for results from leaders and top managers.  

It is striking to note that the NWC, like most of Jamaica’s public sector agencies, generally has the full complement of professionals, qualified engineers, accountants and managers.

The challenge is that institutions often reward procedural compliance more than performance outcomes. It is vital that the country moves from a focus on following procedures, to ensuring that the citizens receive the intended benefit.

The NWC audit points to weak operational management capabilities, and a seeming lack of accountability. The result is less potable water for the population.

The NaRRA debate has shown that there is clear recognition of the problem of lack of capabilities in key areas of the state.

In his speech at the opening of the Troy bridge, the prime minister alluded to the issues and suggested that NaRRA will go a long way in addressing them. 

Supporters argue that NaRRA is necessary because existing institutions cannot deliver reconstruction and major projects quickly enough after disasters. They see excessive bureaucracy, fragmented authority and slow procurement as structural obstacles to recovery. NaRRA is therefore designed as a specialised implementation authority and “single point of coordination” intended to accelerate delivery.  

Critics, however, fear that speed could come at the expense of accountability. They worry about concentration of power, reduced oversight and potential weakening of established governance safeguards.

Both sides are describing different aspects of the same problem.

One side says Jamaica has too much control and not enough execution. The other says Jamaica already struggles with accountability and should not weaken controls.

Both concerns are legitimate.

The fact that NaRRA has generated such controversy suggests a deeper institutional dilemma: How does Jamaica build a state that is both accountable and effective?

That is the central public management question of modern Jamaica. 

The Troy bridge story, the NWC audit and the NaRRA debate all point to the same conclusion:

Jamaica’s next great institutional reform is public sector delivery reform. The country’s central public sector challenge is no longer about how to collect revenues and control expenditure. It is about how to convert plans, budgets and policies into measurable outcomes for citizens. In that sense, Troy Bridge, the NWC audit, and NaRRA are not separate stories.

They are elements of the same national conversation: how Jamaica moves from being a country that reduces its debt, and stabilises its economy to a country that implements, delivers well, with accountability. The many weaknesses in capabilities identified by the auditor general tell us there is a far way to go.