Damion Gordon | Case for term limits in Jamaica

While the imposition of term limits is among the key proposals for constitutional reform in Jamaica, it is currently not a feature of parliamentary democracies globally. Parliamentary democracies hold regular elections but do not institutionalise fixed election dates or term limits.

On the other hand, 80 per cent of presidential and semi-presidential constitutions globally have entrenched presidential term limits, including the majority of countries in Latin America and Africa. Nonetheless, the evidence points to widespread public support for the imposition of term limits among democracies globally. For example, 75 per cent of Africans favour presidential term limits while 83 per cent of Americans favour congressional term limits. In Canada, 54 per cent of people support imposition of term limits for elected officials.

Poll findings from a 2023 Don Anderson survey indicated that 77.1 per cent and 72 per cent of Jamaicans, respectively, favour the imposition of term limits for prime ministers and members of parliament, with the most popular preference being for a two-term restriction.

SUPPORT

At least two of the country’s prime ministers, as well as the current opposition leader, have also expressed support for the imposition of term limits. In 2010, former Prime Minister Bruce Golding introduced a bill to limit the tenure of a prime minister to two terms while current Prime Minister, Andrew Holness, committed to legislate term limits in the JLP’s manifesto of 2016. However, it appears that he has since abandoned that commitment as he is now preparing for his third-term bid, which is widely considered the inflection point at which the risk of an incremental shift from democratisation to autocratisation heightens.

There is no universal consensus on the imposition of term limits. There are compelling arguments for and against this political reform practice. Empirical perspectives highlight that contextual factors should be considered when assessing the effectiveness of term limits in enhancing the quality of democracy.

THEORY OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

One of the main arguments against the imposition of term limits is the theory of electoral accountability, which identifies two negative implications of term limits. This theory assumes that they inorganically and prematurely remove high-quality elected officials from office who have served their constituents well and also reduce their incentive to perform since the threat of being replaced by challengers, in the absence of term limits, creates strong incentives for elected officials to implement good policies to secure future terms in office. The idea is that good politicians should be rewarded with re-election to office and bad ones given the proverbial boot.

However, this theory only holds up in the context of healthy democracies characterised by an informed and engaged electorate, intrinsic incentives for officials to perform, and a fairly non-partisan political culture in which voters can be relied upon to hold elected officials accountable. This may not be the case in Jamaica, where performance evaluation is not always the main basis for the re-election of politicians.

Other factors such as clientelism networks, voter familiarity, incumbency advantage, financial resources, historical voting tendencies, low voter turnout and electoral manipulation often influence election outcomes. Incumbents in Jamaica are frequently re-elected despite high absenteeism from Parliament, failure to introduce bills, lack of bipartisan voting records, limited visibility in constituencies, and failure to drive significant economic or social transformation. Instead of driving performance, the circumstantial evidence suggests that indefinite terms in office engender complacency and mediocrity and fuel voter apathy.

The link between the absence of term limits and voter apathy is clear: most voters are dissatisfied with the quality of representation. Thus, the longer perceived underperforming politicians remain in office, the greater the likelihood that voters disengage from the political process. In the absence of constitutional provisions for recall or impeachment, term limits would automatically limit the tenure of ineffective officials, sparing voters from indefinite collective punishment and potentially reinvigorating their interest in elections as new candidates regularly compete to fill vacated elected offices.

RENT-SEEKING PERSPECTIVE

Another argument against the imposition of term limits for elected officials is that by reducing the value of holding office, term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences.

This argument assumes that because politicians are aware that their time in office is limited, they will seek to maximise personal utility, focusing on deriving the highest level of personal benefit from their access to power, influence and resources. This concern, on the surface, resonates since the absence of a strong political accountability framework produces significant opportunity for elected officials, especially those holding executive offices, to illicitly enrich themselves. The risk of elected officials engaging in rent-seeking behaviour is heightened by lengthier terms in office. This is because lengthy terms in office can accentuate discretionary executive powers, enable incremental corruption that is harder to detect, facilitate the building of protective corruption networks, and contribute to public apathy and weakened oversight over time.

TAKE AWAY POWER FROM VOTERS

Another common argument against term limits is that they “take away power from voters”. However, this argument does not hold up in Jamaica, where many voters either lack interest in voting, vote along strict party lines, or feel powerless in uprooting deeply entrenched partisan traditions. In this sense, the imposition of term limits would be a de facto exercise of power by citizens, institutionalising constitutional limits to protect them from the abuse of power and office by elected officials.

The final argument against term limits is that crafting legislation is a learned skill and that experience matters in politics as in other professions. According to this view, it is not in the best interest of the public to have inexperienced lawmakers shaping long-term laws and policies.

The problem is that politicians are not always elected based on relevant skill sets for effective lawmaking. They have no clear job description, are not subjected to regular performance evaluations, and are not required to attend Parliament consistently despite benefiting from recently inflated salaries. Many long-term politicians in Jamaica have little to show in terms of legislative accomplishments because the country’s clientelist political culture prioritises their role as “patrons” over their role as “legislators”. The imposition of term limits could enhance the efficacy of the legislature by enabling voters to regularly recruit and assess candidates based on factors such as enthusiasm levels, freshness of ideas, and relevant expertise.

Term limits can establish safeguards against the abuse of power since our elections and governing institutions do not always perform as intended. They can also safeguard democracy by promoting alternation in office and preventing the personalizsation of power. Additionally, the imposition of term limits could enhance electoral competitiveness, potentially increasing voter turnout. Instrumental theories of turnout suggest that citizens are more likely to vote when they believe their participation has a decisive impact on the election outcome. By mitigating against long-term incumbency and fostering more open political contests, term limits can increase the perception that voting can produce positive change, thereby encouraging greater voter enthusiasm

Damion Gordon is assistant lecturer of public policy and management and political science at Department of Government, UWI Mona. Send feedback to damion.gordon05@uwimona.edu.jm.