Letter of the Day | Meaningful constitutional reform requires bipartisan consensus

THE EDITOR, Madam:

Recent commentary by Lloyd Barnett in The Gleaner, titled Selecting Jamaica’s Final Court of Appeal, makes a timely and constructive contribution to Jamaica’s ongoing constitutional debate. Barnett outlines the options available to the country concerning its final appellate jurisdiction and identifies a central obstacle: broader constitutional reform remains stalled by disagreement over the location and structure of the apex court.

Given the nature of Jamaica’s parliamentary democracy, meaningful constitutional reform requires bipartisan consensus, especially on foundational institutional questions such as the final court of appeal. The current political reality – where the opposition has signalled that progress is unlikely without resolution of the apex court issue – underscores the necessity of compromise as a prerequisite for reform.

In this context, revisiting past political missteps or perceived transgressions by either side offers little value. What matters instead is identifying institutional arrangements capable of commanding broad political and public confidence. On this score, Barnett’s emphasis on the role of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission (RJLSC) is particularly instructive. Established under the Agreement Creating the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), the RJLSC is widely regarded as a safeguard of judicial independence, given its responsibility for appointing judges through a merit-based process insulated from political control.

Building on this institutional strength, a hybrid model may offer a pragmatic path forward. Under such an arrangement, Jamaica could establish its own apex court while entrusting the RJLSC with responsibility for the appointment and remuneration of its judges. The Government of Jamaica would retain responsibility for physical infrastructure, administrative staffing, and day-to-day operations. This division of responsibilities would preserve national judicial sovereignty while ensuring the credibility and independence of judicial appointments through a trusted regional mechanism.

Such an approach is consistent with established principles of judicial independence, which emphasise the separation of appointment processes from direct political influence. It may also represent an acceptable compromise, addressing the concerns of those who favour a fully Jamaican final court while retaining the institutional safeguards associated with the CCJ model.

Ultimately, constitutional reform will depend less on institutional design alone and more on the willingness of political actors to engage in good-faith compromise. A hybrid solution grounded in existing regional mechanisms such as the RJLSC offers a balanced and credible means of unlocking Jamaica’s stalled reform agenda.

HOWARD C BECKFORD